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1. Introduction 
The European dependence on Russian natural gas has been and continues to be a critical issue. As a 
consequence both political and economic aspects of gas related issues between the two regions have 
been thoroughly discussed in the literature; see e.g. Quast and Locatelli (1997), Oostvoorn et.al 
(1999), Finon and Locatelli (2002), Tarr and Thomson (2004) and Stern (1995 and 2005). In relation 
to the deregulation of energy markets, the European Union has extensively focused on security of 
supply issues, see EU (2000), and perhaps above all on the potential of rising Russian market shares in 
the European gas market. The Russian authorities and Gazprom plan to boost export levels of gas to 
Europe in the years to come.  
 
A high market share of Russian gas should not be any threat to Europe as long as deliveries are stable 
and predictable. However, in addition to adapting to the EU gas directive, there are several other 
challenges and uncertainties within the Russian natural gas industry that have to be dealt with when 
predictions of future Russian gas exports are made. In West-Siberia, the main producing region, there 
are undefined depletion rates for several giant operating gas fields due to uncertain and unique 
physical characteristics. Furthermore, there is lack of financial ability to compensate for the 
production decline and to upgrade the aging transportation network. Finally, there are major 
uncertainties in connection with the speed and effect of the domestic Russian gas market reforms. The 
latter is mainly related to the outcome of the proposed increase in the heavily subsidized domestic gas 
price levels that for decades have distorted Russian inter-fuel competition in favour of gas. 
 
For Europe, the main issue may be how Gazprom, the Russian de facto domestic monopolist and sole 
exporter of Russian gas, will respond to the forthcoming reforms in both the Russian and the European 
natural gas market. Domestic gas price increases may lead to shrinking demand, thereby creating 
opportunities for larger Russian export volumes. However, as the importance of spot markets and gas-
to-gas competition grows in European markets, Gazprom, by virtue of its combined geopolitical 
position and its potential export capacity, may be the single gas supplier that convincingly could 
induce market power in order to influence European gas prices in the future. However, the degree of 
the short-term variability of gas exports to Europe will largely depend on the relative share of gas 
volumes sold in short-term and spot markets. Thus, given a set of capacities and contract constraints, 
the strategy and the allocation of Gazprom gas sales between the domestic and export markets may be 
vital for the level and stability of future Russian gas exports to Europe.  
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In this study we address the following questions: 
1. How will Gazprom´s export performance towards Europe be affected by Russian domestic price 
increases towards 2015? 
2. To what extent will the production capacities of Gazprom and other Russian natural gas producers 
affect exports and the allocation of sales between domestic and export markets under given 
domestic prices? 
3. How may radical changes in the Gazprom export volumes tied to long-term contracts affect the 
allocation of total sales between domestic and European export markets? 
 
We use a numerical optimisation model to study explicitly the effects on Gazprom´s optimal allocation 
of gas sales for a range of Russian domestic gas price levels in 2015. A central assumption in this 
study is that Gazprom, being a state controlled company, has an obligation to serve the domestic 
market at any price if necessary. That is, we assume that the current status of the Russian gas market 
structure will prevail for at least the next ten years. Furthermore, we assume that Gazprom continues 
to have both sole export rights to Europe and de facto control of third party access to transmission 
pipelines connecting producing regions to the domestic markets. Hence, we assume that the current 
relations and market structure in the Russian gas industry, as described above, are sustained over the 
next decade. 
 
Even though the structure and the potential of the Russian gas sector and its coherent importance to 
Europe have attained great interest in both academic literature and in the political environment, there 
have been few, if any, previous studies that aim to model the effect from changes in Russian domestic 
gas prices and production capacities on future Russian natural gas exports. Thus, most studies have 
used a descriptive approach to the political and economic issues concerning the Russian natural gas 
industry, e.g. Oostvoorn et.al (1999), Finon and Locatelli (2002) and Locatelli (2003) and Stern 
(2005). While we in this study look at Gazprom as a monopolist, taking both transit of their export gas 
and other supplies to Europe as given, Hirschhausen et.al (2005) use a game theory approach to look 
at Russian gas exports as a result of a bargaining game between Russia and its transit countries. Other 
studies, e.g. Bjerkholt et.al (1990), look at the supply of gas to Europe as a Bertrand game between 
Russia, Algeria and Norway.    
 
In section two of this study we highlight some important features of the markets in which Gazprom 
operates. In section three we introduce our model and explain some main effects theoretically, while in 
section four and five we present some central data input, the numerical assumptions and the scenarios 
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used in this study, respectively. In section six we present our simulation results and section seven 
concludes. 
2. The structure of Gazprom´s selling markets 
2.1 The domestic market: supply, demand and price 
Russia has the world largest natural gas reserves, production and exports, and is the second largest 
consumer of natural gas after the USA, see BP (2005). Yet, or maybe as a consequence, the Russian 
gas industry is one of the few domestic industries that have escaped strong structural changes after 
Russia started its reforms towards a market economy. Hence, today the vertically integrated company 
Gazprom practically controls the entire gas system as it was constructed during the Soviet era, that is, 
most of the production and processing units, a direct ownership of all high-pressure transmission 
pipelines and sole rights to all gas exports to European markets.  
 
Gazprom is formally privatized as a joint stock company, but the Russian state is the dominant 
shareholder and is involved in its decisions on a strategic, political as well as economic basis. 
Although structural reforms regarding unbundling of Gazprom have been widely discussed, see e.g. 
Stern (2005) and Ahrend and Tompson (2005), there have been no real changes in the activities or the 
structure of the company. The recent purchase of the Russian oil company Sibneft and buybacks of 
gas sales contracts and production rights from independent companies, as well as negotiations with 
regarding Turkmeni gas, have rather strengthened both Gazprom and the Russian state's position in 
both the Russian and the CIS gas markets. Our conjecture is that Gazprom will keep its dominant role 
in production and transportation of natural gas within Russia and to the CIS and Europe in the 
foreseeable future, and the present study is based on this view. 
 
Besides Gazprom there is a small competitive fringe of gas suppliers represented by oil- and 
independent gas companies. Lead by the gas company Novatec, non-Gazprom producers supplied 
about 14% of the total 633 bcm1 of gas production in Russia in 2004. The fact that independent gas 
producers hold roughly 30% of total Russian gas reserves tells that the independents have the potential 
to play an increasing role in the Russian natural gas industry in the near future. The structural 
development of the Russian gas industry, including the relations between Gazprom, the independent 
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producers and the Russian government has been discussed in a number of articles; see e.g. Stern 
(1995, 2005) and Locatelli (2003).  
 
The main non-market feature of the Russian economy inherited from the Soviet era is the low 
regulated gas prices, with price levels historically below long-run marginal costs. Thus, domestic gas 
prices in Russia are currently around six times less than the high market prices received for Russian 
gas exports to Europe, adjusted for transport and transit costs. Formally, the price to independent gas 
producers is not regulated; hence they are free to charge their own price. However, as Gazprom serves 
the major part of the domestic market at low regulated prices, and as Gazprom is de facto in control of 
all gas transportation within Russia, the price at which independent producers sell their gas is close to 
the regulated one. As Gazprom is under tight governmental control, the company is practically 
enforced to secure that the domestic demand is covered at any price level. In this paper we assume that 
this situation will prevail, at least through 2015. 
 
For Gazprom, the consequence of the domestic commitments has been that export profits have 
covered losses at the domestic market. Consequently, Gazprom has long argued for domestic price 
increases to improve the economics of domestic sales and, maybe more importantly, to reallocate 
volumes from the domestic market to export markets, early described in Stern (1995) as "the Russian 
gas bubble". Not surprisingly, the low price levels coupled with widespread allowances of non-
payments and barters have kept the domestic demand for gas very high, and the share of gas in 
indigenous energy consumption in Russia is above 50%. Hence, there might indeed be great potentials 
for a more efficient domestic market and reallocation of gas between markets. However, fear of 
inflation and social instability are important arguments against a quick gas price increase in Russia. 
The compromise has been an official strategy of gradually increasing gas prices that hopefully would 
allow the Russian economy to avoid negative shocks. Nevertheless, considering the political and 
economic instability of the Russian economy and the historical suddenness and inconsistence of 
Russian economic reforms, there are still substantial uncertainties related to how gas prices might 
evolve.  
2.2 The export markets; Europe and the CIS  
Russia and Gazprom is the largest exporter of natural gas to Europe, and in 2003 Gazprom covered  
24% of the EU25 gas demand and represented 45% of the EU25 total imports from external sources 
(including Norway). Despite the additional costs such as export duties and transit payments to Ukraine 
and Belarus, the European gas market is clearly the most profitable market for Gazprom.  
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The prices that European consumers pay for Russian gas are mostly tied to the price on other energy 
carriers such as oil products, and both price and volume are generally determined in relatively 
inflexible bilateral export contracts. Hence, for Gazprom, the contracts provide predictable sales in a 
medium and short run perspective. However, although Russian gas supplies roughly a quarter of the 
European gas market, Gazprom can hardly execute any market power without violating several of its 
delivery commitments. Although the EU has relaxed their stand against long-term take-or-pay 
contracts (EU, 2003), it is believed that the ongoing liberalization of the internal European gas market 
will gradually reduce the role of the long-term contracts in favour of more flexible short-term 
contracts and spot trade 
 
The main CIS consumers of Russian gas are Ukraine and Belarus, and together they use about 85% of 
the Russian gas exports to the former Soviet republics. Close political and commercial contacts 
between Russia and the other former Soviet republics are vital elements when gas export contracts are 
made. The Russian dependence on gas transit through Ukraine and Belarus to reach western markets 
gives these countries further bargaining power in the price negotiations with Gazprom. Hence, prices 
for Russian gas in CIS markets are generally somewhat higher than inside Russia, but still 
considerably lower than prices paid in Europe. CIS prices are the result of short-term bilateral 
agreements between the countries, and are based on political as well as cost considerations.  
 
The production potential in the CIS, particularly in Turkmenistan, is quite large. Hence, by controlling 
the transportation of CIS gas, Russia can use e.g. Turkmen gas to carry out its delivery commitments 
to Ukraine or Belarus or to its domestic users. However, in 2004 the CIS countries produced 155 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, while the same countries consumed 180 bcm (BP Statistical Review 
2005), which means that Russia was a net supplier to the region. Especially Turkmen gas production is 
expected to grow substantially in the near future, reflected by the highly disputed purchase agreements 
between Gazprom and Turkmenistan, see Oil and Gas Journal (2005). For simplicity we will assume 
in the model that supply equals demand in the CIS region, and supplies to the CIS is therefore left out 
of Gazprom´s profit maximization problem. This is not a huge problem, as an unbalanced CIS market 
would have comparable implications for Gazprom as changes in the highly uncertain production level 
from the independent producers.    
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3. GAZALMOD model 
The model GAZALMOD (GAZprom ALlocation MODel) is a simple static numerical optimisation 
model, which looks at one given year, in this paper 2015, and allows quantitative analysis of the 
allocation of Russian gas production volumes between domestic and export markets. The main 
objective of the model is, given a set of capacity constraints, to investigate to what extent different 
patterns of domestic gas price reforms in Russia will influence future export volumes of Russian gas to 
Europe.  Hence, we also need to model the Russian domestic gas market response to different price 
levels, as well as the response from other gas suppliers to the domestic market. 
 
Russia supplies natural gas to practically all net-importing countries in Europe. Thus, the model 
includes all European countries, not only current EU countries, excluding CIS. Since Russia is the 
main supplier of natural gas to Turkey and future exports are mainly tied to long-term contracts 
through the Blue Stream pipeline crossing the Black Sea, we keep Russian supply to Turkey constant 
and exogenously fixed in the model at 16 bcm. 
 
The main player in GAZALMOD is the Russian state controlled gas company Gazprom, which in the 
model behaves as a profit maximizer in both the domestic and export markets. However, in the 
domestic market Gazprom has obligations to meet the demand at any price determined by the 
government or allow alternative sources of supply to fill the gap if necessary. Gazprom allocates its 
production of natural gas between the Russian domestic market at an exogenously regulated price, and 
the European export market, mostly determined by long-term contracts.  
 
The natural gas sold at long-term contracts links sellers and buyers into a bilateral monopoly for a long 
period of time during which both parties have strictly defined obligations to trade a fixed volume of 
gas at a price formula defined in advance, mostly linked to oil product prices. In the model, the long-
term contract prices are fixed. Thus, in the model, part of Gazprom's exports in 2015 is tied to long-
term contracts that cannot be changed. The remaining part of the export is sold at the short-term 
market at prices based on gas-to-gas competition.  
 
With a market share of 28% in Europe in 2004, Gazprom is by far the single largest producing 
company at the European gas market including UK and Eastern Europe. Next to Gazprom are the 
Algerian gas monopolist Sonatrach and the Norwegian company Statoil with roughly 10% market 
share each, see BP Statistical Review (2005) and Statoil Annual Report (2004). Although both 
Sonatrach and Statoil plan to increase their exports towards 2015, this uneven split of the market 
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supports the assumption that Gazprom is the only player with any real market power in an integrated 
European gas market. Hence, we assume that Gazprom can influence future gas prices in European 
spot markets by altering its exports, while both Norway and Algeria will always produce at their 
capacity limit if it is profitable. In GAZALMOD, the competition on the spot market is simplified by 
the assumption that other gas suppliers than Gazprom to the European market act as a competitive 
fringe. Hence, we model a short contract market where Gazprom faces residual demand and can 
execute some market power. In addition to the traditional non-Russian gas exporters to Europe, 
Norway, the Netherlands and Algeria, we also include indigenous supplies and LNG supplies from 
North Africa and the Middle East.  
 
Within Russia, the desired supply from independent Russian gas producers is a function of their 
production capacity and the domestic regulated price, but the actual production is principally 
constrained by the permission of Gazprom to access the national gas transportation system. Even if 
domestic prices are low, Russian oil companies may still find it profitable to sell associated gas from 
their oil fields to the domestic gas market. All natural gas production capacities are exogenous in the 
model, that is, different production capacities of Gazprom and independent companies may create 
potential scenarios for various model simulations. The scenarios and their foundations will be 
elaborated in section five. 
 
Gazprom maximizes its overall profit, that is, the sum of incomes from the domestic and export 
markets subtracted costs. In the domestic market, Gazprom supplies QD at a regulated price PD. A 
given part of Gazprom's income in the export market is sold at long-term contracts. Although the long-
term contract prices are primarily tied to the world oil price, we treat the contract price, PC, as well as 
the contract volume, QC, as fixed in the model. The other part of Gazprom's export supplies, QE, is sold 
in markets determined by gas-to-gas competition rather than oil prices. The price at which Gazprom 
sells QE is determined by a residual inverse demand function PE (QE), taking into account the supply of 
Gazprom's competitors in the European market.  
 
The supply of non-Russian gas producers is also allocated between long-term contracts and short-term 
contracts or spot trade. As for Gazprom, long-term contracts are to be fulfilled in the first place and the 
remaining supply competes at the spot market. We do not model this allocation explicitly but assume 
that the costs of the last unit of gas sold in Europe at long-term contracts by non-Gazprom suppliers do 
not exceed the price at which Gazprom chooses to sell at short-term markets. 
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 Gazprom's objective function in the model is formulated as follows: 
 
 ПG= { }
,
( ) ( ) ( )max
D E
D D C C E E E G D E C E C
Q Q
P Q P Q P Q Q C Q Q Q w Q Q+ + − + + − + ,   (1) 
where CG(QD+QE+ QC) is the cost function of the production and transportation of gas within Russia.  
CG is an increasing convex function, that is, C'G ≥ 0 and C''G ≥ 0. The parameter w reflects the 
additional costs per unit of gas exported outside Russia including transportation and transit costs. 
 
Gazprom's optimisation problem is formulated subject to a set of constraints: 
QD+ QE + QC ≤ K      (2) 
QD+ QI = D(PD)  (3) 
QI  ≤  SI (PD,M)  (4) 
In equation (2), Gazprom's production capacity, K, sets the boundary for the total supply of the 
company. Equation (3) requires that at a given regulated domestic price, PD , the domestic gas demand 
D(PD) must be covered. Supply of independent producers, QI, can be used to supplement Gazprom's 
production to cover the domestic demand. Since Gazprom controls the entire transportation system of 
Russian gas, it also controls the volume of independent gas allowed at the domestic market.  
 
Equation (4) reflects that the volume of gas that independent producers are willing to supply at the 
domestic market is constrained by a supply function SI (PD,M), which is based on the profit 
maximization of the independent producers, given the regulated price, PD , and the production capacity 
M.  Thus, we have 
 
{ }DIDI PXCMMPS == )('arg,min),( ,  (5) 
 
where C´I(X) is the marginal production cost function of the independent producers. C'I (X)≥ 0 and 
C''I(X) ≥ 0. Thus, QI is determined endogenously in the model constrained by (3) and (4). Constraints 
(3) and (4) can be reformulated as: 
 
D(PD)- SI (PD,M) ≤ QD (6) 
QD≤ D(PD) (7) 
 
Constraint (7) ensures that Gazprom's supply to the domestic market does not exceed the demand.  
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Then Gazprom's allocation problem (1), (2) and (6), (7) yields the following first-order conditions 
(FOC): 
 
FOC:  w.r.t. QD: PD- C'G(QD+QE+ QC) -λ+γ -ϕ=0 (8) 
FOC: w.r.t. QE:  MR(QE)- C'G(QD+QE+ QC)-w -λ=0 (9) 
 
In (8) export marginal revenue MR(QE)= P'(QE )QE +P(QE ). In the FOCs Gazprom's restrictions on 
the production capacity, the delivery obligation to the domestic market and the restriction of 
Gazprom's supply to domestic consumers created by the domestic demand, are introduced with the 
non-negative shadow prices  (Lagrange multipliers) λ , γ  and ϕ  respectively. When a shadow price is 
non-zero, the respective constraint is binding. Shadow price λ represents the valuation of an additional 
available capacity unit; shadow price γ  represents the valuation of the reduction of delivery 
obligations to the domestic market by one unit; shadow price ϕ  reflects the value of an additional unit 
demanded domestically by Russian consumers. 
 
If  γ =0 and ϕ=0, neither Gazprom's obligation to ensure the domestic demand coverage (6) nor the 
demand constraint (7) are binding. Then from the FOCs we get: 
 
MR (QE)- w= PD (10) 
 
Equation (10) says that Gazprom allocates its gas production between two markets, equalizing the 
marginal revenues between domestic and export markets. Thus, differentiating the FOCs with respect 
to PD we get: 
 
0
)('
1)( ≤=
∂
∂
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QMRP
PQ
 (11) 
0
''
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∂
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PQ
  (12) 
 
In this case, a positive λ will equally raise the cost of supply to both markets, and hence, downsize the 
allocation choice of QD and QE. 
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If γ >0 and ϕ=0, then constraint (6) in Gazprom's allocation problem is binding, and Gazprom will 
supply more domestically than what is optimal for the company. When QD=D(PD)-SI (PD,M), where 
QD is a decreasing function of PD, we get: 
 
0),()()( ≤
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
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D
D
D
D
DD
P
MPS
P
PD
P
PQ
        (13) 
 
In this case, in order to reduce the costs at the domestic market and to minimize domestic deliveries, 
Gazprom will allow as much gas as possible from the independent producers to the domestic market, 
hence; QI= SI (PD,M) and 0≥∂
∂
D
I
P
Q
. Consequently, Gazprom’s domestic supply is residual after the 
optimal supply of the independent producers. 
 
If  γ =0 and ϕ >0, then constraint (7) in the Gazprom's allocation problem is binding, otherwise 
Gazprom would supply to the domestic market more than what is demanded. Thus, Gazprom alone 
will cover the domestic demand; QD=D(PD) and QI=0, 0≥∂
∂
D
D
P
Q
. This case, however, requires a very 
high domestic price, PD.  This is rather unrealistic, especially within the current market framework 
where Gazprom operates, and will not be discussed further in the numerical analysis. 
  
Finally, for both γ >0 , ϕ=0 and γ =0 , ϕ >0 , QE is determined only by (9), while QD  is constant under 
the given domestic price, PD. Differentiating (9) with respect to PD  we get: 
0
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                                                                                                             (14)
   
When λ ≥ 0 in (9), that is the production capacity constraint (2) is binding, and export supplies at spot 
market conditions is residual after domestic and long-term export supplies; 
 
QE=K-QD-QC. (15) 
 
Under given PD we define Q*D(PD) and Q*E (PD) as an optimal solution to Gazprom's allocation 
problem where (6) and (7) are non-binding. Then, we define two threshold gas prices PT1D and PT2D 
from the respective equalities Q*D(PT1D)= D(PT1D )- SI (PT1D,M) and Q*D(P T2D)= D(PT2D ). PT1D 
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express the lowest price level where the marginal profits from domestic sales exceed marginal profits 
from exports and PT2D express the lowest price level where Gazprom serves the entire domestic market 
and all additional sales go to the export markets. Hence, PT1D < PT2D, and the prices PT1D and PT2D are 
both turning points of Gazprom's allocation of gas sales at increasing domestic prices, as described 
analytically below. 
 
For any price, PD ≤  PT1D, then Q*D(PD) ≥  D(PD ) - SI (PD,M) and γ >0 ,ϕ=0.  
For any price, PT1D≤ PD ≤  PT2D, then  D(PD ) - SI (PD,M) ≤  Q*D(PD) ≤  D(PD ) and γ =0 ,ϕ=0.  
For any price, PD ≥ PT2D, then D(PD ) ≤  Q*D(PD) and γ =0 ,ϕ >0.  
4. Data and calibrations 
4.1. Costs 
We base the estimates of Gazprom's cost function in the model on the estimates made by OME (2004), 
where the Russian supply costs for delivery to the EU29 border from different production regions are 
estimated for the period 2010-2020. The gas delivery costs depend on the remoteness of production 
from the market as well as on the extraction conditions of the fields for each production alternative.  
 
We divide Gazprom's supply costs in two separate parts, costs of production and average 
transportation costs within Russia respectively. In order to establish an approximate marginal cost 
function we apply the general functional form used by Golombek et.al (1995): 
 
C’(q)=a+b*q+d*ln(1-q/K+1),          (16) 
 
where q is total supply (q= QD+QC+QE), K is  the production capacity, and a, b and c are parameters. 
Calibration of the parameters is based on actual production and transportation costs data and provides 
the following numerical marginal cost function:  
 
C'(q)=27.08+0.03*q-1.36*ln(1-q/K+1)        (17) 
  
Based on export duties, transit costs, and a longer transportation route of exported gas compared with 
domestic supplies, we include a parameter w in Gazprom`s export cost function. Data from Landes 
et.al (2004), Gazprom Financial Report 2004 and IEA (1993), suggest the value of w to be 
$45/1000m3. 
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We apply the same functional form to the marginal supply costs of independent producers as we do for 
Gazprom. In order to reduce the dependence on Gazprom related to gas transport, independent 
producers often choose their consumer markets to be relatively close to production area, see Stern 
(2005). This makes the average gas transportation costs of the independent producers lower compared 
with Gazprom. Based on cost information from the financial reports of various Russian oil companies 
(Yukos, TNK-BP and Lukoil) and other informations on costs and future gas projects of independent 
producers, we calibrate the numerical cost function for independent producers to be;  
 
C'N(q)=12.05+0.19*q-8.1*ln(1-q/K+1)        (18)  
4.2 Demand and supply elasticities 
For the calibrations of natural gas demand in Europe and Russia we use 2003 data for gas prices, 
consumption levels and GDP levels, see BP (2005), Rosstat (2005) and World Bank (2004) and 
projections for GDP in Europe and in Russia by 2015, see EIA (2004). We assume that in the capital-
intensive gas industry, the 10 years time span that we are looking at is a relatively short period for gas 
consumers and producers to adjust their behaviour following price and income changes. Therefore, 
mid-term elasticities that are between short-run and long run elasticities are used for demand and 
supply functions calibrations. 
 
However, there is in general little consensus in the literature about the price- and income elasticities in 
energy markets, and estimated elasticities for Russia are almost non-existing. The elasticities that have 
been estimated vary and are primarily obtained for member countries of the OECD. In the survey by 
Al-Sahlawi (1989) on price and income elasticities of natural gas demand, short-run price elasticities 
range from -0.07 to -0.63 and long-run price elasticities range from -0.56 to - 4.6. Due to the lack of 
decisive evidence we have chosen a value for the price elasticity of natural gas demand in Europe to 
be -0.5, which is on the edge of short-run and long-run demand price elasticity estimates. 
 
The only known estimates of elasticities for Russia are found in an econometric study made by 
Solodnikova (2004). She finds no significant link between natural gas consumption in Russia and the 
price of gas. The result can be partly explained by low natural gas tariffs relative to other energy 
carriers. As natural gas stays as the cheapest energy source in Russia, a price change may not have a 
notable effect on consumer behaviour. In addition, the Russian energy infrastructure was built during 
the Soviet planned economy and allowed low substitution possibilities between energy alternatives, 
hence consumers still often have to rely on one-energy carriers. Nevertheless, some studies use a price 
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elasticity around -0.5 for natural gas demand in Russia, see e.g. Holtsmark and Mæstad (2002) and 
Tarr and Thomson (2004). We choose something between the results of Solodnikova and the latter 
studies, i.e., -0,3, assuming that future domestic market reforms will bring on more substitution 
possibilities between different fossil fuels, so that the consumers response to gas price variations will 
be larger than zero in 2015. 
 
We further assume the income elasticity of demand for natural gas in Russia to be 0.7, which is 
between the short- and long run income elasticities estimated by Solodnikova (2004). Al-Sahlawi 
(1989) shows that in OECD countries, short-run and long run estimates of income elasticities of 
demand vary from 0.008 to 0.9 and from 0.1 to 6.4 respectively. For simplicity reasons we assume the 
income elasticities of demand in Europe to be the same as in Russia.  
 
Referring to estimations of world natural gas supply elasticities by Krichene (2002), we choose the 
price elasticity of supply to be 0.7 when we calibrate the supply function of natural gas to Europe by 
non-Russian producers. 
 
Changes in the elasticities used in the model will obviously have an impact on the numerical results. 
The best indicator of this may be the changing values of the threshold prices, described in section 3.  
However, the main qualitative findings, that is, domestic prices will have a systematic impact on the 
allocation of Gazprom gas sales between markets, will still exist. In the discussions we will elaborate 
more on the sensitivities of changing elasticity values. 
5. Numerical assumptions and scenario descriptions 
5.1 The production capacity of Gazprom  
In 2004 Gazprom's production was 545 bcm, and that is slightly more than the target Gazprom 
publicly stated some years before; namely to achieve and maintain annual natural gas production 
levels at 530 bcm through 2010, see IEA (2002). The uncertainty concerning further gas field 
developments in Russia, which is related to both economic and physical constraints, has been one 
reason for such modest projections. Therefore, the risk of future production capacity shortage has 
already been indicated, see e.g. Oil&Gas Journal (2001) and Petroleum Economist (2002).   
 
The three West Siberian giant gas fields, Medvezhye, Urengoy and Yamburg, currently accounting for 
roughly 63% of Gazprom’s production, have all reached their peak of production and experience a 
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production decline, see Stern (2005). There are major uncertainties concerning how the future decline 
rates at these fields will develop. The Siberian giant fields are unique and they have already 
experienced different patterns of production decline. Uncertain physical characteristics, related to both 
the overall field size and the development in field pressure, make the future decline rates of these 
fields highly uncertain.  
 
The largest developed gas field in the European part of Russia is Orenburg, however, this gas field is 
also in its decline phase. We assume that the growing production from the Astrakhanskoye field might 
compensate for this decline. According to estimates by Landes et.al (2004), production from the 
Russian satellite fields might be doubled during the next decade under favourable economic 
conditions. On the other hand, various conjectures about the production from the "big three" West 
Siberian fields by 2015, give us an annual production range from these fields of 150 bcm-270 bcm. 
 
The giant Shtokman field in the Barents Sea and the fields of Yamal Peninsula have both vast gas 
deposits. Difficult mining conditions require huge investments, hence production start-up from both 
these fields has been constantly postponed. As it is projected today, e.g. in Landes et.al (2004), 
production from Yamal might start between 2010 and 2015 at the earliest, and Shtokman gas will 
likely reach the European markets even later. Taking into consideration the recent Gazprom strategy to 
sell Shtokman gas to US using the LNG technology rather than piping it to Europe, a pipeline to 
Europe from the Barents Sea seems even more distant. Therefore, we believe that towards 2015, 
primarily smaller associated fields in the West-Siberian Nadym-Purtaz region, often called satellite 
fields, will compensate for the production decline of the three giants. 
 
Due to the huge uncertainties regarding the physical field characteristics of the most central producing 
gas fields in Russia, we choose to run different scenarios of production capacities rather than 
modelling the capacities endogenously based on cost figures. We look at three plausible scenarios of 
Gazprom's production capacity in the model. We choose the current production capacity at 540 bcm as 
our medium scenario and the production capacities of 500 bcm and 580 bcm are chosen to be 
pessimistic and optimistic scenarios respectively. 
 5.2. Independent producers production capacity 
Although independent producers account for only 14% (roughly 88 bcm) of current Russian 
production, it is assumed that they have proven reserves to increase their gas production substantially. 
A number of oil companies have indicated that they are willing to boost both utilization of associated 
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gas and production from their pure gas fields if they are guaranteed access to markets, see Landes et.al 
(2004) and WGI (2005). Novatek, currently the largest independent gas producer, supplied 5% of 
Russia's domestic gas market in 2004, and a forecasted production growth indicates that the company 
alone may be able to reach a production level of 50 bcm already by 2010, see WGI (2005b). 
 
According to "Russia’s Energy Strategy through 2020" (2003), the volume of “independent gas” at the 
domestic market can reach 120-135 bcm per year by 2015. But even though the production potential 
of independent producers is high and the investment shortage is not an obstacle, as long as Gazprom 
can control the market access, independent producers are reluctant to initiate new projects that will 
increase their production capacity. On the other side, even if Gazprom opens up for competition, the 
independent producers will still need several years to increase their capacities. In this study we 
consider three scenarios for independent producer’s production capacity; 80 bcm, 120 bcm, and 160 
bcm respectively. 
 
5.3 Transportation capacity 
In spite of the widely discussed transit friction that Gazprom faces in Ukraine, we assume that 
sufficient export transportation capacity to Europe will not be any problem the next decade. "Russia's 
Energy Strategy Through 2020" (2003) estimates the export to Europe by 2015 to be somewhat lower 
than 160 bcm. The already existing export pipelines through Ukraine and the Yamal-Europe corridor 
through Belarus can carry 168 bcm of gas to Europe annually. During the next decade the Yamal-
Europe pipeline is expected to expand from the current 20 bcm capacity to the initially planned 
capacity of 33 bcm per year. The construction of the North European Pipeline through the Baltic Sea, 
as a diversification alternative for Gazprom's export routes, will give at least an extra 20 bcm of export 
transportation capacity annually. These projects, together with an ongoing joint project by Gazprom 
and the Ukrainian oil and gas company NaftoGaz Ukrainy to boost export capacities through Ukraine 
through increased compression, can provide Gazprom a total of 225 bcm annual export transportation 
capacity by 2015, see Landes et.al (2004). As the expected transport capacity seems to be well above 
all known export targets, we do not explicitly model any export capacity constraint, however, we 
report in the discussions if the modelled outcomes for Russian exports in 2015 exceed the assumed 
transport capacity number. 
 
In 2004, the Russian domestic gas transmission system handled a total 687 bcm, see Landes et.al 
(2004). This is well above Gazprom's total production that year and includes transportation of transit 
 18
gas, mainly from Turkmenistan, and gas from independent producers. We assume excess capacity in 
the domestic transmission network towards 2015.   
5.4 Long-term export contracts 
A more competitive European gas market implies the entrance of new contract mechanisms, such as 
spot-markets and short-term contracts. Whereas long-term contracts remain important, their share and 
average contract duration will be reduced, see Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2004). Nevertheless, 
with today's regular contract duration of 15-20 years, a large portion of the European gas market will 
still be fed by long-term contracts by 2015. A large volume of long-term contracts creates heavier 
obligations and less flexibility for Gazprom`s exports. On the other hand, long-term contracts 
constitute a firm basis for investments and ensure financing for the capital-intensive infrastructure 
field developments. 
  
In this study we use the relative share of natural gas traded at long-term contracts as an indicator of 
how quick the liberalization process will go forward. In 2004, Russian exports of natural gas to Europe 
reached 140 bcm, and practically all this gas was sold at long-term contracts. As our focus is on a ten-
year horizon, a significant portion of the long-term contracts that Gazprom has today will not end 
before 2015. By 2015, it is believed that one third of the gas traded in Europe will be sold at short-
term contracts or spot markets, see Fellers (2004). Hence, with the "Russia's Energy Strategy Through 
2020" estimate of exports to Europe at 160 bcm, we assume 120 bcm to be a base scenario for the 
volume of Russian gas export sold at long-term contracts in 2015.  
 
In order to test for a response to variations in long-term contracts, we also run the model for volumes 
of long-term contracts in 2015 at 80 bcm and 160 bcm, which indicate quick and slow liberalization 
progress scenarios respectively in the European market. Running the model with the domestic price 
range we assume the price and volume of long-term contracts is fixed. Hence, we assume that the 
contract price is equal for all long-term contracts, including new contracts in the "slow liberalization 
scenario. When the liberalization of the European gas market is quick, contract renegotiations will 
explain the reduction of long-term contract volumes to 80 bcm.  
5.5 The domestic price reform 
As described earlier, massive investments in the Russian natural gas industry are needed to develop 
new fields, to compensate for the decline of the West Siberian giants and to improve the gas 
infrastructure. The increase of domestic gas prices is therefore believed to be essential to provide the 
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necessary investments into the Russian gas industry, consequently, a gradual price increase is one of 
the main elements in the Russian energy strategy.  
 
Since 2000 industrial domestic prices on natural gas have been raised by 10-20% annually in nominal 
terms. However, real price growth was positive only during last two years with 14% and 5% in 2004 
and 2005 respectively. Under current prices and exchange rate, domestic gas price raised from 
27$/thousand m3 in 2000 to 32$/thousand m3 in 2005. "Russia's Energy Strategy Through 2020" 
(2003) stipulates further gradual growth of domestic gas prices and foresees the price to be over 64$ 
by 2015 in current prices. An average annual increase of 8% in real and 17 % in nominal prices will be 
required to reach the aimed price level. However, we assume that the government will not allow an 
annual growth of the natural monopoly tariff that exceeds the inflation target of 8-10% by too much. 
Taking into account the regular downward adjustments of earlier projected domestic price increases, 
we adopt a modest projected price development in our model. Hence, taking into account great 
uncertainties concerning the future domestic price level, we run the model with a domestic price range 
for 2015 (in current prices) of 37-64 $/1000 m3 for all potential scenarios, shown in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1:  Adopted scenarios 
Gazprom’s production capacity 
("cap") (bcm) 
Independent gas producers 
production capacity ("ind") (bcm) 
 Volume of long-term export 
contracts ("Qc") (bcm) 
500 80 80 
540 120 120 
580 160 160 
6. Model results and discussions 
In the discussions below, our aim is to highlight the model results based on our main research 
questions. The fundamental assumption in all the scenarios is that Gazprom is in total control of both 
exports to European markets and pipeline access to domestic markets. Furthermore, it is essential for 
the results that we in all scenarios assume a political “domestic-market-comes-first” attitude when it 
comes to the Russian state regulation of the Gazprom gas supplies. In table 2, below, we outline the 
mechanisms behind the model results that are discussed later in this section. The table shows four 
possible phases of Gazprom and independent gas supply decisions as the domestic gas price varies 
from our low-end level ($37/ 1000 cm) to our high-end level ($64/1000 cm).  
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Table 2: Different output-phases in GAZALMOD 
 
We see that for the lowest domestic prices, Gazprom generally wants to minimize the sales 
domestically, as indicated by phase I and II, hence a maximum of independent supplies are desirable. 
However, the low prices give no incentives for independent producers to supply at their capacity limit 
if the price is lower than their marginal costs of production. Consequently, Gazprom has to cover a 
relatively larger residual domestic demand at any cost due to their obligations as the supplier of last 
resort at the domestic market. For the low-end prices, the residual domestic demand is so high that 
Gazprom will use all of its leftover capacity to serve the more profitable European export market. 
 
At slightly higher domestic price levels, the demand response is negative, creating possible additional 
volumes for the export markets. This continues up to a certain point where Gazprom´s supply to the 
European short-term market is so large that marginal revenues at the European spot market equal the 
marginal costs of exports, hence Gazprom´s production are no longer constrained by production 
capacities, as indicated by phase II. Gazprom will still allow as much independent gas as possible, as 
long as domestic prices are lower than marginal costs, which means that independents can supply as 
much as they want. 
 
Higher domestic prices will eventually lead to a turning point for the allocation of Gazprom supplies 
that is when domestic market becomes profitable. This will effectively lead to a gradual shift of 
 I II III IV 
Regulated domestic 
price level (PD) 
Low end  
($37/ 1000 cm) 
===>           PT1D            ===> 
High end 
($64/1000 cm) 
Gazprom Capacity (K) 
vs. Total supply (S) 
K = S K > S K > S K = S 
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Min. domestic 
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∂
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∂
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Gazprom supplies from export markets to the domestic market. Therefore, the access of independent 
producers is kept below their desired optimal production level, as indicated by phase III. In this phase 
Gazprom’s overall production may be below its production capacity if overall capacities are high. In 
the last phase IV, domestic prices are so high that Gazprom wants to use all its residual production 
capacity to serve the domestic market after export profits are maximized.  
 
Needless to say, the realization of these model phases will highly depend on the various combinations 
of the capacity- and contract constraints that are applied in this study. The discussions below will sum 
up the main findings concerning the allocation of Gazprom´s supplies when faced with the different 
capacity- and contract constraints. 
6.1 Production capacities and export performance 
In order to isolate the effects on Russian exports from changes in the domestic price and Gazprom´s 
production capacity we keep the level of independent production capacity and long-term contract 
export volumes constant at their assumed medium levels, both at 120 bcm in our model year 2015. 
Figure 1 shows total exports towards Europe for medium (540 bcm), high (580 bcm) and low (500 
bcm) Gazprom production capacities as a function of the domestic price range applied in this study. 
 
Figure 1: Russian gas exports to Europe at constant independent 
supplies
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cap=Gazprom`s production capacity, Qc=long-term contract volume, ind=independent producer’s production capacity 
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As higher domestic prices restrain domestic demand in Russia, a larger export potential is created, 
often described as the Russian natural gas bubble. We find that the Russian domestic natural gas 
demand shrinks by roughly 80 bcm in 2015 if the domestic price is increased from $37 to $64 per 
1000 cm. This is a strong indication that the Russian domestic gas market reforms alone may have a 
substantial effect on the total amount of Russian gas sold in the European market. 
 
As long as export markets are more profitable, Gazprom will allow maximum independent domestic 
supply at any domestic price. However, for the low domestic prices, independent supplies are 
constrained by their own cost function and capacity. Thus, in this situation Gazprom would have 
preferred to earn more on additional sales to export markets if other suppliers had covered more of the 
domestic market in the first place. As Gazprom exports above the long-term contract level will have a 
downward effect on European gas prices, Gazprom will face declining marginal profits to the point 
where marginal export costs equals marginal export revenues in the short term market, referred to as 
phase II in table 2. In this situation Gazprom will hold back exports even though there are both 
production and transport capacities available. Our results indicate that given medium independent 
production capacities and medium long-term contract volumes, only the optimistic Gazprom 
production capacity scenario will provide sufficient export volumes to induce any market power at the 
export market, as the domestic market will claim or attract too much of Gazprom´s total capacity. 
 
When the domestic price increases and the European short term market price decreases, it also moves 
the marginal profitability of gas sales in favour of the domestic market to the point where the domestic 
market is profitable, referred to as phase III in table 2. This is clearly shown in figure 1 for both the 
medium and high Gazprom capacity alternative, as export numbers starts to fall when the domestic 
prices are sufficiently high.  
 
We observe that for domestic prices in the lower range, Gazprom is actually unable to carry out its 
export obligations of 120 bcm, even when the company achieves its most likely production capacity of 
540 bcm per year. This is obviously also severely behind its future export targets2, and even for 
domestic prices at $64/1000 cm, the target may not be reached if the production capacity of Gazprom 
falls to more pessimistic levels.  
 
We find that only when we look at the optimistic production capacity scenario, Gazprom will meet its 
long-term export contract obligations at any domestic price after domestic markets are taken care of. 
                                                     
2 Gazprom aims to reach an export level towards Europe of at least 190 bcm per year by 2010, see WGI (2005c) 
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In this scenario, the export targets are also met at sufficiently high domestic prices. However, even in 
the optimistic scenario, the assumed export transportation capacity limit of 225 bcm in 2015 is not 
met.  
 
From the discussions above, we clearly see that both domestic price reforms and sufficient 
independent gas supplies seem to be essential for the Russian gas industry in the future. If Gazprom is 
forced to give priorities to domestic market obligations, it is straightforward that Gazprom export 
volumes will suffer badly from the potential lack of supplies from alternative producers, particularly if 
the Gazprom production capacity is too low to compensate for the decline itself. Figure 2, below, 
shows the importance of independent supplies for Russian exports as we compare various 
combinations of Gazprom and independent production capacities at the same range of domestic price 
levels, holding Gazprom export contract obligations constant at 120 bcm. 
 
Figure 2: Russian gas exports to Europe at different levels of independent 
supplies
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The importance of independent gas supplies for the Russian gas exports is most obvious when we 
compare two scenarios with optimistic Gazprom capacities, of which the scenarios implement an 
optimistic independent supply of 160 bcm and a pessimistic supply of 80 bcm respectively.  If 
Gazprom production capacity growth and independent capacity reductions (or vice versa) outweigh 
each other, our results show that exports are higher for larger Gazprom capacities. This is due to the 
independent producer's profitability requirements that make these producers an unreliable replacement 
for Gazprom domestic supplies, particularly at low domestic prices. Thus, exports may be sacrificed if 
Gazprom capacities are low, even in the optimistic independent capacity alternative. Figure 3 
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explicitly shows the volumes of independent gas supplies for the same scenarios displayed in figure 2, 
and thus highlights Gazprom´s control over independent pipeline access. 
 
Figure 3: Domestic supplies from independent gas producers
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Figure 3 shows that only when the combined Gazprom and independent capacity is low, independent 
producers will supply gas at their optimal levels, even for the highest domestic price levels. At 
sufficiently high overall capacities, Gazprom will exercise its monopoly power in the domestic market 
to squeeze independent supplies if domestic prices are high enough to make the domestic market 
profitable. 
 
On the other hand, if Gazprom has sufficient production capacities, we find that optimistic 
independent supply may create greater possibilities for Gazprom to exercise market power in Europe 
at domestic prices below the market profitability "turning point", as we observe that Gazprom 
produces up to 20 bcm less than capacity in this situation.  
6.2 The role of long-term contracts for the allocation of Gazprom supplies 
In this section we will take a closer look at the potential effects from a changing European gas market 
structure on the levels of gas exports from Russia towards Europe. We use three different levels of 
assumed long-term volume contracts connected to Gazprom in 2015, indicating different stages in the 
process towards an open spot market based European gas market. Having a look at our earlier 
findings, it is obvious that the allocation of Gazprom supplies is more likely to shift for larger overall 
Russian production capacities of natural gas. That is, our findings suggest that when export markets 
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are more profitable, Gazprom will use available independent capacities to cover parts of the domestic 
market and reallocate its sales towards Europe. If the domestic market is more profitable, Gazprom 
will reduce its exports and reallocate its supplies towards domestic markets until sales in both markets 
are equally profitable at the margin. The latter Gazprom strategy, however, is only viable if export 
volumes are not already tied up in inflexible long-term contracts of which both price and volume are 
fixed. Hence, a liberalised European export market, largely determined by more flexible short-term 
contracts and spot sales, seems to favour Gazprom in terms of possibilities to exercise market power in 
the European market. As our findings suggest that larger overall production capacities will create 
better terms for a flexible allocation of Gazprom supplies, we want to investigate the effect from 
different European market structures given optimistic capacities of both Gazprom and independent 
producers. The results are shown in figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4: Russian gas exports to Europe at different long-term contract 
volumes
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As figure 4 clearly reveals, the level of gas exports tied to long-term contracts may prove to be highly 
significant for Gazprom´s allocation of gas sales in the future. Our results indicate that Gazprom will 
reduce its exports in favour of domestic gas sales at lower domestic prices and at lower export 
volumes if long-term contract volumes are reduced. At the lowest Russian gas prices in our study 
range, $37/1000 cm, we see that the level of contract volumes plays no role for Gazprom´s export 
performance. However, as domestic prices increase, there is a growing difference in export 
performance, depending on the initial level of gas volumes tied to long-term contracts. The rationale 
behind this finding is that export prices are more sensitive to additional exports when the share of 
flexible short-term markets is large. Thus, in this situation, Gazprom has incentives to hold back 
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exports to prevent prices from falling too much. As Gazprom faces increasing marginal costs for 
higher production levels, we find for the low domestic prices that Gazprom holds back its total 
production to achieve optimal sales in both domestic and export markets. In this situation domestic 
prices are not large enough to cover the costs and increased exports will lead to lower export prices 
than what is optimal for Gazprom. Hence, Gazprom regulates its export volume to achieve optimal 
prices and revenues in its export market, and regulates independent supplies to achieve optimal 
revenues in the domestic market. This active use of price oriented market power in export markets and 
volume based market power in domestic markets are best shown by displaying the Gazprom total 
production level, shown in figure 5 below.  
 
Figure 5: Total Gazprom production at different levels of long-term 
contract volumes
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Figure 5 clearly reveals that with larger sensitivity of export prices, shown by a larger spot market, the 
larger are the incentives and willingness to use accessible market power to influence prices in that 
particular market. Hence, in a situation with long-term contract volumes of 80 bcm, Gazprom may end 
up with an excess production capacity of roughly 20 bcm per year. This excess capacity is, of course, a 
combined result of a large and price sensitive spot market and the flexibility in production created by a 
smaller domestic market due to the higher regulated prices. When the total production starts to 
increase in figure 5, it is an indication that at the production turning point, the domestic price level is 
large enough to cover the production costs. Hence at this point Gazprom start to replace independent 
supplies at the domestic market. 
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When contract volumes occupy most of the exports, the spot markets are too tiny to have a significant 
effect on the average export price level. Thus, in this scenario, given the high overall production 
capacities, our results show that Europe may even experience a Russian export level close to 250 bcm, 
see figure 4. In this case, however, transportation capacities may be a serious bottleneck.  
6.3 Sensitivity of changing elasticities in GAZALMOD 
A change in the elasticities applied in the model will not alter the primary qualitative results, that is, 
domestic prices will have a systematic impact on the allocation of Gazprom gas sales between 
domestic and export markets. However, it is natural to expect some changes in the absolute values of 
Gazprom supplies to the consumer markets. The model sensitivity to changes in elasticities will 
primarily relate to a shift of the threshold prices, discussed earlier in section 3, and the corresponded 
export level. Table 3, below, summarizes the relative change in threshold price PT1D and Gazprom's 
export volume when each elasticity parameter in the model is increased and reduced alternately, 
keeping all other parameters at their base levels. We use the medium capacity scenario3 for all 
sensitivities. The results show that changes in the price- and income elasticities of the Russian gas 
demand give by far the most vital effects on the model output.  
 
Table 3: Effects of elasticity changes on PT1D and Gazprom’s export (in %) 
 
Demand price 
elasticity in 
Russia 
Demand price 
elasticity in 
Europe 
Demand income 
elasticity in Russia
Demand income 
elasticity in 
Europe 
Supply price 
elasticity of non 
Russian producers 
Elasticity used in 
the model 
-0,3 -0,5 0,7 0,7 0,7 
New Elasticity -0,1 -0,5 -0,3 -0,7 0,5 0,9 0,5 0,9 0,5 0,9 
Change in PT1D(%) 52 -15 -2 3 -14 19 -5 7 -2 2 
Change in export 
(%) 
-32 11 -3 1 9 -13 -5 4 -2 0,3 
 
                                                     
3 Gazprom production capacity (cap) = 540 bcm, long-term contract volume (Qc) = 120 bcm, independent production 
capacity (ind) = 120 bcm 
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7. Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to highlight the possible outcomes for Russian gas exports to Europe at 
different Russian domestic gas prices in 2015. Given a plausible range of Russian domestic gas prices, 
we have run scenarios based on fundamental uncertainties regarding Gazprom and non-Gazprom 
production capacities and the speed of European market deregulations. With regard to the European 
security of supply issue, we believe that all these factors should be considered carefully when 
predicting future Russian exports to Europe. 
 
Firstly, it seems obvious that increased domestic gas prices in Russia will create improved export 
possibilities due to decreased Russian gas demand. In fact, a Russian gas market price reform may be 
absolutely necessary if Russian export targets and even export commitments through long-term 
contracts are to be achieved. Still, if Gazprom continues to be the domestic gas provider of last resort, 
scarce production capacities of both Gazprom and independent producers will restrict export volumes 
due to the assumed governmental domestic market priorities. Secondly, our results indicate that if 
domestic prices become sufficiently high, the domestic market becomes the most profitable market at 
the margin. This will also lead to relatively lower Russian gas exports. 
 
Finally, an interesting finding of this study is the potential of Russian market power in Europe created 
by relatively smaller shares of long-term contracts due to the liberalization of the European gas 
market. This means that a European gas market based on gas-to-gas competition may experience an 
upward pressure on gas prices due to Gazprom`s monopolistic behaviour in its export markets.  
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